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5월 1일 수요일 오후 1시 15분 부터 상본 102호에서
Indian Statistical Institute 의 Debasis Mishra 교수님께서
" Stable dissolution of a partnership "
라는 주제로 세미나를 하실 예정입니다.
금주에는 607호가 아닌 102호에서 세미나가 진행되므로 유의해주시길 바랍니다.
하기된 논문초록을 참고하시고, 관심 있으신 교수님과 대학원생 여러분의 많은 참여 부탁드립니다.
감사합니다.참고 ㅡ 논문초록
Abstract: We study a model where agents have property rights (partnership structure) of an object and the object needs to be efficiently reallocated (partnership needs to be dissolved): typical examples include reallocating land, allocating estate to claimants, allocating an object in a bidding ring etc. It is well known from Cramton, Gibbons, Klemperer (CGK), 1987, that the set of partnerships that can be efficiently dissolved (i.e., using a Bayesian incentive compatible, efficient, budget-balanced, and interim individually rational mechanism) is a convex set centered around the equal partnership. We impose an additional desiderata in this model - the mechanism used for dissolving the partnership must be stable. We explore two notions of stability: (1) ex-ante incentive compatible core and (2) interim incentive compatible (IC) core. The two notions of stability correspond to the timing of blocking by coalitions of agents (using their partnership shares). We show that ex-ante IC core is non-empty for all partnership structures, and identify a canonical mechanism which is ex-ante stable. We show that the set of partnerships that can be dissolved using a mechanism in interim IC core is a non-empty convex subset centered around the equal partnership. Surprisingly, the CGK mechanism is neither in ex-ante IC core nor in interim IC core for some partnerships that can be dissolved efficiently.