연세대학교 경제학부

Abstract: We study a model where agents have property rights (partnership structure) of an object and the object needs to be efficiently reallocated (partnership needs to be dissolved): typical examples include reallocating land, allocating estate to claimants, allocating an object in a bidding ring etc. It is well known from Cramton, Gibbons, Klemperer (CGK), 1987, that the set of partnerships that can be efficiently dissolved (i.e., using a Bayesian incentive compatible, efficient, budget-balanced, and interim individually rational mechanism) is a convex set centered around the equal partnership. We impose an additional desiderata in this model - the mechanism used for dissolving the partnership must be stable. We explore two notions of stability: (1) ex-ante incentive compatible core and (2) interim incentive compatible (IC) core. The two notions of stability correspond to the timing of blocking by coalitions of agents (using their partnership shares). We show that ex-ante IC core is non-empty for all partnership structures, and identify a canonical mechanism which is ex-ante stable. We show that the set of partnerships that can be dissolved using a mechanism in interim IC core is a non-empty convex subset centered around the equal partnership. Surprisingly, the CGK mechanism is neither in ex-ante IC core nor in interim IC core for some partnerships that can be dissolved efficiently.